Wednesday, December 9, 2009

Afghanistan: the Road to Nationhood

"Losing the war is not an option"

by Arend Jan Boekestijn (original article in Dutch)

Pundits are wont to remind us lately of George Orwell's words: the fastest way to end a war is to lose it. Afghanistan has divided the West. We have acted so recklessly that it appeared at times as if losing the war in Afghanistan was indeed the object. But it would have dire consequences for Western security.

For those who are taking pleasure in debunking Obama: losing the war in Afghanistan is no option. As long as Europe seeks strength in diversity, appeasement and cashing in on peace divident we shall have to settle for Obama. Defeat means nothing less than an affirmation of the jihadists' view that the decadent West has no staying power.

Failure would be a colossal encouragement to even widen the front. In case you're not so sure: defeat in Afghanistan means that the Pakistani jihadists, who won't rest until they've appropriated the national nuclear arsenal, will be able to use Afghanistan as a hide out. To use the word defeat in such a situation, reveals a shocking deficit in responsibility.

It is wiser to learn of ones mistakes. In Afghanistan the US and NATO have chosen for a light military presence. This forced Karzai into making deals with warlords that were in their economic tribal interests. Some were even included in the Government: keep your friends close, but your enemies closer.

Like half a century ago in South Vietnam, when President Ngo Dinh Diem was given to understand that he must democratize, Karzai was driven to an act of similar political suicide given the lack of a loyal opposition. This weakened his position even further. Karzai is quite literally consumed by paranoia. At night he rides his chauffeur driven car through Kabul, hoping to discover what is really going on.

Finally Karzai's political system was made to absorb such insane amounts of aid, that corruption, inherent in this patrimonial system, rose to alarming levels. In Africa we have corrupted many political systems with development aid, but that is insignificant compared to the intervention in Afghanistan. The mistakes in Africa were multiplied hundred fold.

And yet, in all this gloom over this fest of follies and flubs there's some reason for optimism. First of all, it is encouraging that Obama, like his predecessor George Bush, albeit reluctantly, chose for a surge. Admittedly, 30,000 extra troops is minimal, and half of what General McCrystal's requested, but Obama has come through in spite of severe opposition in his own party.

It is very well possible that 30,000 troops are too few to force a breakthrough in the war, but that sounds hollow from the mouth of an inhabitant of a continent whose contribution in the effort is only minimal compared to the American effort. Why doesn't Europe do more?

Secondly, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has shaded somewhat Obama's assurance that withdrawal would go ahead in the summer 2011. That will only happen if the circumstances allow. This is not without significance, because the famous 3-D approach - Defense, Diplomacy and Development - can only succed if the West shows fortitude.

We are talking an involvement of decades here, not just a few years. Anyone who believes the West will never be able to muster the staying power may be right, but should stop complaining about severe damage to the alliance and a potentially fatal defeat in the fight against political Islam. It's not an attractive perspective. Moreover, alternative presence on the ground, like cruise missiles and drones, offer even less chance of success. Whether we like it or not, we won't fix this problem without boots on the ground.

The question is also if the economic crisis will allow America the cost of a major contingent after 2011. If not, we're in deep trouble as the EU is still unable to act militarily. The word 'still' reflects politeness rather than realism. There is no reason for joy over the economic resilience of Obama's country either.

Neither is there about Obama's inquisitiveness. But he steered wisely clear of mentioning democratization in the same breath as failing states. That's a bonus. Anyone who witnessed the blood-curdling spectacle of the Afghan election can rest assured. Ballots without functioning institutions and a loyal opposition - in other words, without a civil society - are a recipe for instability and in-fights.

Elections in closed societies are of a different nature than we're accustomed to. In civil societies temperatures may rise, but they lead to legitimization because the new Government reflects the results of the ballot box, irrespective how disastrously difficult a governing coalition may be formed.

In the absence of a civil society the dynamics of the ballot box potentially undercut the understanding between the leaders of the oligarchy not to use force. As a result few can resist the temptation of vote-buying. And that is precisely what happened in Afghanistan. When the second candidate withdrew, the Americans had no choice but to endorse Karzai. His legitimacy is at an all time low.

Above anything else Afghanistan needs stability and order. Only then there's the chance of a meaningful relationship between the center and the periphery. It is up to us to shield the Afghan regime from becoming a safe-house for those who wish to destroy Western civilization. Jihadists from Pakistan using Afghanistan as a launching pad to topple the regime in Islamabad must also be prevented.

Before we can safely speak of stability we need to ask ourselves why we're training an Afghan standing army. For Karzai? I don't think so. He's a dead man walking. A military corps will only bring stability if it reflects the existing balance of power, giving it legitimacy in the 19th Century meaning of the word. This will not enthuse everyone in the West.

The American proposal to finance tribal militias is very dangerous, but not inept. A tribal balance of power at the provincial and central level is not to be sneezed at. The alternative, training Afghan armed forces, is not without its problems. The current army is tribally unbalanced and it is no wonder upto a third has deserted. It's fairly easy for the Taliban to infiltrate such an artificial construct.

Stability will only be possible in Afghanistan if the Westminster model is neatly tucked away, to gather dust somewhere in a nondescript drawer. Think tribal, practical, undeterred, and bide your time. All other options, democratization, abandonment or just providing development aid, will lead to an instable order, at odds with vital Western interests.

What should the Netherlands do? Forget about being a leading ISAF nation, recoup, and go back to the area where vital interests are at stake: the Greater Middle East. And to those who think that the West lacks the political will to endure this fight over longer stretches of time, I can only advise you to seek refuge under the bed.

Arend Jan Boekestijn is a historian, assocated with the University of Utrecht, the Netherlands. His book "De Prijs van een Slecht Geweten" (The Price of a Bad Conscience") (Aspekt Publishing) will hit the bookstores next Friday.

Friday, December 4, 2009

#ClimateGate: Another Reputation Royally Crushed

Another shock! [/sarc] Elsevier Magazine is reporting that the Dutch weather service is also in the tank with ClimateGate.

Elsevier: "Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute (KNMI) is also implicated in the scam"

With the exception of the Libertarian Party (VVD) and Geert Wilders' Freedom Party (PVV) all politicians are keeping stum on the subject.

(We already went into the rebuttal delivered by the relevant Minister which went along the lines of Barbara Boxer: "Minister for Eco Hysteria Cramer has condescendingly commented on the Hadley hack by attacking the messenger (hackers are criminals!), also charging the emails were published "selectively" and - surprise! - "taken out of context".)

Elsevier's paper version has an indepth article on ClimateGate this week. They're also warning for the consequences for credibility of the field of science, which is indeed in serious peril.

The article by Science journalist Simon Rozendaal goes on to state that (free translation) ...

"I was alerted yesterday to the fact that Dutch climate researcher Rob van Dorland is also caught up in ClimateGate. My esteemed colleague, Science journalist Marcel Crok (a chemist like myself, an advantage when you're writing on the subject of CO2 in my opinion) published an outstanding article in the magazine Physics and Technology about the hockey stick manipulation."

"Marcel Crok showed how the trick was done and cited Rob van Dorland, the inhouse climate man at the Dutch Royal Meteorological Institute (KNMI). Van Dorland at first stated something was wrong, but later on claimed he was ... cited out of context."

"In one of the ClimateGate emails Phil Jones expresses his satisfaction to Michael Mann that Van Dorland was wrongly quoted in "that Dutch magazine". This suggests that Van Dorland - who is a regular IPCC contributor - something which is considered important in the Netherlands - was pressed upon by Jones to recant, so as not to endanger his ICPP status. "

"Enormous interests are caught up in climate research. Researchers are the recipients of great amounts of subsidies, power and reputation, may fly around from convention to convention - business class. Corporations and environmental organizations are making millions, based on their conclusions.

"In other words, it is quite conceivable that scientists, corporations, environmental organizations and sympathetic media are trying to cover up ClimateGate. That should not be happening. Also not in the Netherlands."

Simon Rozendaal

Read it in Dutch >>>


- NOS: "Geen marginalisering van sceptici? Kom nou!", by Hans Labohm
- De Pers: "Scepsis wordt bestreden met overheidsgeld"